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THE SEARCH FOR AUTONOMY IN HISTORY OF SCIENCE

In fall 1984, I had the good fortune to meet Sam Schweber when I arrived at Harvard University's Department of History of Science as a visiting scholar with a postdoctoral fellowship from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. Having been trained first in physics, I remembered his name as the author of the formidably difficult (for me!) *Introduction to Relativistic Quantum Field Theory*, which I had closed as soon as I had opened it, as I immediately realized that the approach was too formal for my taste. Not yet familiar with his infinite generosity and attention to young scholars, I was really amazed that he asked me to work with him on an essay review of Andy Pickering's book, *Constructing Quarks*. I remember that I told him right away that he would have made a good priest with his very humanist attitude toward people.

This profoundly humanist aspect of Sam's personality makes him very concerned about the future of the discipline of history of science as a *community of scholars*, and in this contribution in his honor I would like to briefly address one of the reasons which, I think, contributes to explain the actual predicament that historians of science face. I will not raise the obvious question of access to the job market and the possible overproduction of PhDs in the field. Instead, I want to discuss a tension inherent in the discipline of history of science, which, I think, lies at the heart of the recent debates about the state of the discipline.

Probably more than any other kind of historians, historians of science are torn between several masters: scientists, philosophers, sociologists and general historians. Fifteen years ago, Paul Forman made a major contribution to the question of the intimate relation between historians of science and scientists, condemning the lack of intellectual autonomy of the former from the latter.² But his call for "independence not transcendence for the historian of science" is still to be fulfilled when one sees the various pressures scientists put on historians of science who want to do more than simply contribute to the creation and celebration of the internal mythology of scientific disciplines. While Forman had a moral view of the need for independence, insisting that each individual had to stand up and fight for his or her autonomous judgment, I think that an institutional analysis provides a better way to identify mechanisms in which this autonomy could be grounded.

Yves Gingras and Silvan S. Schweber, "Constraints on Construction", Social Studies of Science, vol. 16, May 1986, pp. 372–383.

⁴² Paul Forman, "Independence not Transcendence for the Historian of Science", *Isis*, vol. 82, March 1991, pp. 71–86.

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As Forman rightly observed, professional independence is not the same as intellectual independence.³ But I think the specific form taken by this professional autonomy, particularly in the United States, is not unrelated to the identity crisis felt by many historians of science. The creation of special Departments of History of Science (or any combination of history and philosophy and sociology of science and technology) *outside* established departments of history has not, I think, helped historians of science to take their distance from scientists. In fact, the gaining of independence was made even more difficult when these special departments were located in faculties of science instead of faculties of humanities and social sciences.

This particular form of institutionalization of history of science was largely contingent and had no logical necessity. After all, over the last century the discipline of history has always been able to adapt to a changing context by incorporating new objects of historical inquiry into its curriculum and research agenda. The emergence of the special fields of history of workers, industrialization, immigration, women, etc., *inside* history departments – often through difficult academic debates – clearly shows that a specialization of history of science, as opposed to creating an autonomous discipline, was possible. Being an integral part of the historical discipline would help historians of science to benefit from the sense of intellectual autonomy that historians have acquired over the years. A diverse and strong historical discipline certainly helps curb any control that some actors would like to have over the kind of questions raised – and answers proposed – about objects chosen. Sam often said publicly that for him, Frank Manuel was a model historian. It is not insignificant, I think, that as a historian Manuel was not feeling the pressure of the scientist's "super ego" peering over his shoulder when he wrote Isaac Newton Historian and A Portrait of Isaac Newton. In short: institutional distance can contribute to intellectual independence.

Comparing the historian of science with the political historian sheds new light on the limited autonomy of the former compared to the latter. Which professional historian would take seriously a book on political history controlled by a panel of former politicians? By contrast, few eyebrows were raised at the publication of the book on the history of solid state physics, *Out of the Crystal Maze* although the whole enterprise was in fact controlled by a "blue-ribbon" committee of physicists (some of them Nobel Prize winners) who were also central actors in the story and decided which topics to include and to exclude. Surprisingly, even this benign comparison may be considered offensive and may be rejected by scientists or their self-appointed spokespersons. In fact, I personally experienced this reaction when I asked the above question using this comparison with political control in a review of that book for the journal *Science*. Simply suggesting such lack of independence (if not a direct conflict of interests) was too much and – as I had in fact expected⁴ – they

Ibid., p. 77.

⁴ Dominique Pestre was witness to that prediction. I wrote the review while in Paris, showed it to him and said they would call me on receiving it to cut the analogy with politics. Which they did ... Who said sociology cannot be experimental?

asked me to get rid of that analogy and to rephrase my analysis. They finally accepted that I conclude by saying that "let us hope that historians of science will use [the book] to frame their questions in the terms of their own discipline rather than according to the preoccupations of the scientists, which are perfectly legitimate but nonetheless distinct from those of historians". That the journal *Science* was a gatekeeper not only of the *content* of science but also of its *public image* was obvious to me but this fact became even more obvious when four years later the book review editor of the journal took "early retirement" over the turmoil raised by the publication of Paul Forman's review of the book *The Flight from Science and Reason*.

The "science war" is thus simply the most recent attempt by scientists to regain control of the research agenda of historians of science. The decision not to appoint Norton Wise at the Institute for Advanced Study in 1997 should be more than sufficient to show that institutional autonomy from scientists is crucial for intellectual autonomy. Confronted with such events, it is amazing to see how much energy is consumed by some historians and sociologists of science in order to convince scientists that they should care about their work, when it is in fact obvious that the aims of historians' and sociologists' analysis cannot be the same or even congruent with those of scientists without losing their specificity. Here again the analogy with political history is interesting: when politicians disagree with a historical analysis provided by a professional historian, nobody expects the historians to bend over backwards in order to convince the politicians.

Instead of trying to win scientists for their analyses, historians of science should strive for a better integration of history of science into mainstream intellectual, social and cultural history. For if it is true that science is part of history and not outside it, then the teaching of (and research in) history of science should also be part of history departments and not outside them. Of course, this does not mean that history of science departments as such cannot gain independence of thought. It only means that they are more vulnerable than generic disciplines like history, sociology and philosophy in periods of crisis. It is also clear that a better integration within the historical discipline will transform the analytical approaches, as the rise of social history of science and the relative decline of technical or internal history are in large part effects of a more thorough historicizing of science.

The main losers will of course be the scientists who will have greater difficulties in trying to control the historians' research agendas and who will lose their "scribes"

⁵ Yves Gingras, "Redefinitions in Physics", Science, vol. 260, 21 May 1993, pp. 1165–1166.

⁶ For a brief summary of these events see *The Economist*, 13 December 1997, pp. 77–79.

⁷ If one includes larger social debates one should also remember the cancellation in 1995 of the original Enola Gay exhibit at the Smithsonian; see Edward T. Linenthal, Tom Engelhardt (Eds), History Wars. The Enola Gay and Other Battles for the American Past, New York, Metropolitan Book, 1996.

 ^{42 8} I am thinking here of the book edited by Jay A. Labinger and Harry Collins, *The One Culture?* 43 A Conversation About Science, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 2001.

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who wrote their grandiose odyssey as previous historians wrote the life of famous politicians, insisting on their devotion to their nation and their *grandeur d'âme*. Now scientists will have to write these kinds of books for themselves; for this genre is no longer part of an autonomous specialty that defines for itself the hierarchy of legitimate questions and answers about "science" as an historical entity.

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